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If Europe is serious about climate change, it has to reduce its overall greenhouse gas emissions by 
80% by 2050, thereby effectively going to a (near-) zero carbon energy and thus, electricity system. 
The European Climate Foundation, Eurelectric, and the International Energy Agency have 
consequently published a study elaborating on the final goal of this transition. The studies project 
scenarios of how such a (near-) zero electricity system would look like and provide recommendations 
on the policies needed to guide the transition. In this paper, we observe that these studies tell a tale 
with many similarities. In spite of increased energy efficiency, the electricity demand is projected to 
increase substantially, with up to 50% from today towards 2050, due to shifts from other sectors 
towards electricity. This demand will be supplied by a minimum of 40% electricity generation by 
RES, with the remainder being filled up with nuclear and fossils with CCS. The importance of grid 
reinforcement, expansion, and planning in this context is emphasized in all three studies. While all 
three studies further recommend relying on the EU ETS for the transition, the European Climate 
Foundation and the International Energy Agency consider continuing with targets for RES in 
combination with a more harmonized EU RES support scheme. 
Keywords 
European Energy Policy; Electric Power Generation; Decarbonization  
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1. Introduction 
1.1 Background to the decarbonization of the European electric power sector by 2050 
To minimize the impact of global warming, the global atmospheric temperature increase should be 
limited to 2 – 2.4 °C. This requires greenhouse gas (GHG) atmospheric stabilization levels of 445 – 
490 ppm, corresponding to a CO2 concentration of 350-400 ppm (IPCC, 2007). The current 
concentration level of CO2 is about 385 ppm (compared to a level of 280 ppm CO2 before the 
industrial revolution), and still rapidly increasing, as current global GHG emissions amount to about 
50 Gton per year (IPCC, 2007). To achieve the targeted stabilization level and limit the temperature 
increase to about 2°C, an immediate drastic reduction in GHG emissions is required: global emissions 
will have to come down by at least 50% (up to even 85%) in 2050, compared to the level in 2000 
(IPCC, 2007).  
If the global population will be around 9 billion people by 2050, then the average per capita 
emission should not exceed about 2.5 ton per year per person. One of the hot potatoes in the current 
debate is how to distribute the required efforts among the different regions in the world. Historic and 
current emission levels are very disproportioned, with North America and Europe having the highest 
per capita emissions: CO2 emissions (from fuel combustion) were about 18 ton CO2/y/p in the US and 
about 8 ton CO2/y/p in Europe, in 2008 (IEA, 2010b). In terms of GHG emissions, these levels were 
about 24 ton CO2-eq/y/p in the US and 10 ton CO2-eq/y/p in Europe, in 2000 (MacKay, 2009). When 
calculating cumulative emissions, the discrepancy between the developed and developing regions 
becomes even more apparent. Thus, given the current disproportionate emission levels and the 
expected economic growth of developing countries, a general consensus exists that the developed 
world will have to engage a larger effort than the reported 50%. A reduction in the range of -80% is 
often proposed (in many reports as scenario benchmark, see further, confirmed at the G8 meeting in 
2009 in L’Aquila). Furthermore, given the fact that the whole world will have to contribute to this 
reduction of emissions, it can be assumed that the targeted 80% of emission reduction in the developed 
world will have to take place within these regions themselves. This envisaged emission reduction 
towards 2050 is presented in Figure 1. 
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Figure 1. Greenhouse gas emission pathway towards 2050. Source: (Delbeke, 2009). 
 
The targeted 80% emission reduction implies that the energy sector and definitely the electric power 
sector will have to become carbon free. The reason is that the limited emissions that can still occur in 
2050 (i.e. 20% of what was emitted in 2000), will be emitted in sectors where it is more difficult to 
reduce GHG emissions, i.e., emissions from agriculture and meat consumption (CH4 and N2O), 
emissions in specific transport sectors (air, maritime, freight – although bio fuels and/or hydrogen 
might play a role on a longer term) and several non-CO2 emissions from industry (ECF, 2010; Jones 
and Glachant, 2010).  
1.2 Tale of three studies 
The paper will focus on the European electric power sector. We analyze the following three studies 
and scenarios: 
•  The Power Choices scenario, from the Power Choices report by Eurelectric (2010). 
•  The three decarbonized pathways from the Roadmap 2050 report by the European Climate 
Foundation, ECF (2010). 
•  The BLUE Map scenario, from the Energy Technology Perspectives (ETP) of the International 
Energy Agency, IEA (2010a). 
These studies have in common that they project scenarios in which Europe moves towards a near 
carbon free electricity system
1:  
•  The Power Choices scenario features a 75% reduction in 2050 compared to 1990 levels for the 
EU’s overall CO2 emissions. This overall reduction implies a near carbon free electricity system. 
The remaining emissions in the power sector in 2050 are projected to be 25 kg/MWh. 
•  The Roadmap 2050 features an overall 80% reduction of GHG across the EU-27 below 1990 
levels by 2050. This results in a decarbonized power sector, with power sector emissions 
reported to decrease by 96% compared to 1990, resulting in about 10 kg/MWh in 2050. 
                                                      
1  The electric power sector’s current CO2 emission intensity (2007) amounts to about 400 kg/MWh (Eurelectric, 2009). Decarbonizing the European Electric Power Sector by 2050: A tale of three studies 
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•  The BLUE Map scenario of the ETP features a global halving of CO2 emissions, with OECD 
Europe needing to reduce CO2 emissions by 75%, in 2050, compared to the 2007 level. The 
electric power sector is projected to be almost decarbonized, with the emission intensity in 2050 
reported as 15 kg/MWh. 
To facilitate the readability of the paper, we will refer to the scenarios under consideration by basically 
referring to the organizations that released the studies, i.e., Eurelectric for the Power Choices scenario, 
the ECF for the Roadmap 2050 decarbonized pathways, and the IEA-ETP for the BLUE Map 
scenario.  
The studies are also comparable in their geographic scope: 
•  Eurelectric presents numbers for the EU 27. 
•  The ECF presents numbers for the EU 27, but some figures include Norway and Switzerland.  
•  The IEA-ETP has a global focus, but does present separate numbers for OECD Europe, being 19 
EU Member States, and Iceland, Norway, Switzerland and Turkey. 
The paper starts by comparing the (near-) zero carbon electricity systems that are projected in these 
studies in terms of demand, supply, balancing of demand and supply, and costs (Section 2). Our work 
then focuses on the policy recommendations given in the studies to guide the transition towards a 
decarbonized European power sector (Section 3). The paper finally concludes with pointing out the 
main similarities and differences that result from this comparison. 
2. The electric power system in 2050 
This section first focuses on the demand for electricity in the above mentioned scenarios. Second, an 
overview of the trends in the system’s generation portfolio is presented. Third, the matching 
generation and demand is considered. Fourth, the projected additional costs of such a transition are 
discussed.  
2.1 Demand for electricity 
2.1.1 Introducing the options 
The demand for electricity is determined by several factors, being population, wealth, the degree of 
electrification and energy efficiency on the demand side. Assuming the trends in population and 
welfare as given, only the last two parameters are left to influence the electricity demand.  
First, the degree of electrification plays an important role because the electricity sector is a sector 
where decarbonization is feasible, both technically and institutionally. The options in the other energy 
sectors, i.e., transport and heating and cooling are much more limited. In transport, CO2 emissions can 
be reduced by more stringent norms on cars, but when using an internal combustion engine running on 
fossil fuels, the potential further increase in energy efficiency is limited by the laws of 
thermodynamics, and a significant amount of emissions remains. To move to a low or even zero 
carbon transport system, basically three options exist: bio fuels, hydrogen and electric vehicles. Bio 
fuels might play a role, but there are concerns related to sustainable production and security of supply 
(when these bio fuels would be imported) and conflicts with food and feed production. Hydrogen is an 
energy carrier just like electricity. It can be produced from electricity, or directly from fossil fuels 
(which would have to be equipped with Carbon Capture and Storage (CCS) in a zero carbon 
framework). Hydrogen has a very high energy density per unit mass (but quite low per unit volume), 
and can be converted to kinetic energy in a combustion engine or to electricity by means of a fuel cell. 
However, the transition towards a full hydrogen economy seems currently still very uncertain. Hence, 
given these considerations, electricity has to play a role in transport. A similar story applies for the Erik Delarue, Leonardo Meeus, Ronnie Belmans, William D'haeseleer and Jean-Michel Glachant 
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heating and cooling sector. The available options are using solar heat or biomass, applying district 
heating (fueled on biomass or fossil fuels with CCS) or make use of heat pumps and air-conditioning. 
The options of solar heat, biomass and district heating should be employed whenever economically 
and technically feasible. However, heat pumps will play a role and hence, a shift towards electricity 
will occur. To conclude, a shift from both the transport and the heating and cooling sector towards 
electricity is a typical outcome of the projection scenarios with stringent carbon constraints on the 
overall energy sector (ECF, 2010; Eurelectric, 2010; IEA, 2010a). 
The second factor that has an impact is the energy efficiency on the demand side. Increasing energy 
efficiency is often identified as the priority in climate action. Current electric devices (lighting, 
fridges, motors, etc) leave room for improvement. Energy efficiency improvements in other sectors, 
e.g., insulating houses so as to minimize heating requirements for heat pumps (or making heat pumps 
more efficient themselves), or enhancing the efficiency of electric vehicles can further have an effect 
on the demand for electricity.  
2.1.2 Scenario comparison 
Improved energy efficiency in low-carbon scenarios results in an electricity demand that is about 10 to 
20% lower compared to the baseline cases (net of any demand shift) (ECF, 2010; Eurelectric, 2010). 
However, due to the demand shifts from transport and heating and cooling towards electricity, demand 
amounts to values comparable to the baseline cases (in the IEA-ETP, demand in the baseline remains 
higher). The following values for the European electricity demand in 2050 are reported in the three 
scenarios under comparison: 
•  Eurelectric: 4776 TWh 
•  ECF: 4600 TWh (4900 TWh when including Norway and Switzerland) 
•  IEA-ETP: 4306 TWh
2 
The demand for electricity in the EU 27 in 2007 amounted to 3136 TWh (Eurelectric, 2009); so a 
significant increase in the use of electricity is projected in all three studies, with up to as high as 50%, 
mainly as a consequence of an increase in overall energy use and an increasing degree of 
electrification. 
2.2 Electricity generation  
A European zero carbon power system in 2050 will most likely consist of a mix of Renewable Energy 
Sources (RES), nuclear and fossils with Carbon Capture and Storage (CCS). In what follows we 
introduce the options and then compare which ones are taken in the scenarios of the three studies. 
2.2.1 Introducing the options 
The crucial parameter related to RES is the potential, both technically and economically (what is 
available and at what cost). The current economically most attractive technologies are hydro, wind and 
certain forms of biomass. Solar PV, concentrated solar power (CSP) and wave/tidal are currently too 
expensive to make them competitive with classic generation any time soon, while conventional 
geothermal is very location-specific. Enhanced geothermal is attributed a very high potential, but 
many uncertainties (also related to cost) remain. In Europe’s current RES generation portfolio, hydro 
has the largest share (Eurelectric, 2009). The potential for the deployment of additional large-scale 
hydro is, however, limited in Europe, although some potential in south-eastern Europe and for small-
                                                      
2  The value from the ETP (IEA, 2010a) on p308 is reported here, which differs from the considerably lower value reported 
on p313, i.e., 3636 TWh. Decarbonizing the European Electric Power Sector by 2050: A tale of three studies 
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scale installations remains. Wind is projected to enjoy the largest growth in the period up to 2050, and 
to constitute the largest share of RES in 2050. Both on- and offshore wind is expected to be developed 
further and to benefit from reducing costs (already on the short term). Biomass currently is widely 
used, but the further potential is uncertain, given the possibly limited availability, concerns related to 
sustainable production and security of supply and conflicts with food and feed production. At present, 
PV faces costs as high as 200 up to 400 €/MWh (IEA/NEA, 2010), dependent on the location, i.e., 
level of irradiation. However, costs are expected to come down rather fast. Once cost competitive, a 
wide-spread potential across Europe is available. As CSP requires direct sunlight, the potential is 
limited to Southern Europe, although being substantial. Wave/tidal and enhanced geothermal are still 
in an immature state and the actual potential and costs remain uncertain. 
Concerning nuclear, the development will be mainly determined by political and public acceptance. 
After a long period of nuclear submissiveness, new reactors are currently being built in Finland, 
Bulgaria, Slovakia and France, with a combined capacity of 5888 MW (European Nuclear Society, 
2010; Sioshansi, 2009). Some other member states have also expressed their intentions to start with 
the development of nuclear, or to expand the existing capacity with additional units. Whether a so-
called nuclear renaissance actually will occur, remains to be seen. It might already turn out 
challenging to keep the current amount of nuclear generated electricity stable, as many units are 
approaching the end of their economic lifetime (Sioshansi, 2009). The cost of new nuclear is very 
uncertain and wide ranges and regional differences are reported (IEA/NEA, 2010). 
The theory of CCS is clear: keep using fossil fuels and capture and store the released CO2 
underground. Given the world wide massive reserves of easily available coal, CCS seems 
indispensible in a low carbon future (as this coal will be used, certainly on a global scale). However, 
the technology is currently still in a developing state and has to be demonstrated to be feasible on a 
large scale at acceptable cost. Apart from high investment costs, a high CO2 price or regulations will 
be required to trigger actual use of the CCS part, as a significant share of the power is needed to drive 
the CCS part
3, thereby lowering the plant’s net efficiency and flexibility.  
2.2.2 Scenario comparison 
Table 1 below presents the electricity generation
4, by fuel, as [%] of the total generation for the 
scenarios considered. The projected shares for 2010 are also included (Eurelectric, 2010). The ECF 
basically postulates three decarbonized scenarios for the EU’s power system (ECF, 2010), with RES 
ranging from 40% up to as high as 80%, with the remainder being equally divided between nuclear 
and fossils with CCS.  
                                                      
3  Energy is required to separate the CO2 from the flue gases in post combustion, to create H2 in an IGCC, or to create pure 
O2 for the combustion in an oxyfuel installation. 
4  It should be stressed that these values are for electricity generation, i.e., energy [MWh]. Figures for installed capacity 
[GW] are presented further in the paper. Erik Delarue, Leonardo Meeus, Ronnie Belmans, William D'haeseleer and Jean-Michel Glachant 
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Table 1. Comparison of relative electricity generation by technology.  
   2010       2050     
     Eurelectric     ECF     IEA-ETP 
           40% RES  60% RES  80% RES       
   [%]   [%]    [%]  [%]  [%]    [%] 
              
Hydro  10.3%   7.5%      12.0% 12.0% 12.0%      17.1% 
              
Wind onshore  4.8%  11.6%   9.0%  11.0%  15.0%  14.2% 
Wind offshore  0.5%   8.7%     2.0%  10.0%  15.0%     7.9% 
              
Biomass  3.5%    8.0%  8.0%  12.0%   7.1% 
Biomass + CCS  0.0%  
6.9% 
    0.0% 0.0% 0.0%      0.4% 
              
Solar PV     4.0%  12.0%  19.0%   3.9% 
Solar CSP 
0.5%    4.3% 
    3.0% 5.0% 5.0%      2.2% 
              
Geothermal  0.2%    2.0%  2.0%  2.0%  1.7% 
Tidal  0.0%    0.0%  0.0%  0.0%  0.7% 
Other  0.0%  
1.4% 
    0.0% 0.0% 0.0%      0.0% 
              
Tot RES  19.8%   40.4%    40.0%  60.0% 80.0%      55.2% 
              
Nuclear  28.5%   28.4%    30.0%  20.0% 10.0%      29.3% 
              
Coal + CCS  0.0%    10.0%  7.0%  3.0%   11.0% 
Coal + CCS retrofit  0.0%    5.0%  3.0%  2.0%  0.0% 
Other solids  25.5%  
16.9% 
    0.0% 0.0% 0.0%      0.0% 
              
Gas  24.3%    0.0%  0.0%  0.0%  1.5% 
Gas + CCS  0.0%  
13.6% 
   15.0%  10.0%  5.0%     3.0% 
              
Oil  2.0%   0.7%      0.0% 0.0% 0.0%      0.0% 
              
Tot  100.0%   100.0%      100.0% 100.0% 100.0%      100.0% 
Note: Recall that geographic regions differ slightly: Eurelectric is EU 27, ECF is EU 27 + Norway and 
Switzerland, IEA-ETP is OECD Europe. 
When focusing on the share of renewables, the following observations emerge. The minimum share of 
renewables is 40%, resulting from the Eurelectric scenario, and postulated in the 40% RES scenario of 
the ECF. Between both, there is a difference between hydro and offshore wind, likely due to the fact 
that the numbers of the ECF include Norway and Switzerland, both having significant hydro 
resources. The amount of renewables proposed in the IEA-ETP scenario is higher, about 55%, with 
especially a high number for hydro. This is again partly due to the geographic region considered 
(OECD Europe for example includes Norway, Switzerland and Turkey). When comparing IEA-ETP 
and the 60% RES scenario of the ECF, the share of hydro remains high in the IEA-ETP scenario, 
while the number for PV (12%) in the 60% RES ECF scenario tends to be significant. The 80% RES 
scenario of the ECF can be considered as sort of an outlier, with especially the high number for solar 
PV that catches the eye. In terms of nuclear, there seems to be a consensus among the different 
scenarios to about 30%. In the 60 and 80% RES scenarios of the ECF, the number for nuclear is lower, Decarbonizing the European Electric Power Sector by 2050: A tale of three studies 
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being 20 and 10%, respectively. Recall that these numbers for nuclear in the ECF scenarios are 
postulated, and do not result from an optimization. When considering the amount of fossils, the 
Eurelectric scenario features about 30%, almost equally spread between coal and gas. This 
corresponds to the (postulated) 40% RES scenario of the ECF. The IEA-ETP scenario has a 
considerably lower amount of fossils, with remarkably low numbers for natural gas (which might lead 
to questions concerning dynamic balancing of the system to cope with the large fraction of intermittent 
generation, see further). 
As a comparison to current numbers, the projected electricity generation in 2010 (see first column) 
for the European (EU-27) consists of about 20% RES, (mainly hydro, accounting to 10%-pts of 
overall generation, followed by wind with about 5%-pts), 28% nuclear and a little over 50% fossil 
fuels, with a total generation of about 3090 TWh (Eurelectric, 2010). Taking into account the expected 
increase in demand for electricity towards 2050, this means that in a scenario with 40% RES, the 
amount of electricity generated by RES would have to be multiplied by 4 in the period 2005 – 2050, 
i.e., a spectacular increase, taking into account that the easy part (being hydro) is already exploited. 
The amount of nuclear would have to be maintained and even increased (up to as high as 40%), while 
the generation by fossils will decrease. 
Note that all these numbers are for generation [TWh] (expressed in relative terms). The relative 
share of installed capacity of, e.g., RES will have to be much higher compared to nuclear and fossil 
fuel plants, given the low load factors of, e.g., wind compared to nuclear and coal with CCS. The 
installed capacity in 2050 amounts to the following: 
•  Eurelectric: 1318 GW 
•  ECF, 40% RES: 1280 GW 
•  ECF, 60% RES: 1700 GW 
•  ECF, 80% RES: 2020 GW 
•  IEA-ETP: 1350 GW 
The installed capacity of the Eurelectric scenario, the ECF scenario with 40% RES and the IEA-ETP 
scenario are comparable. As a comparison, the installed capacity in the EU-27 in 2007 amounted to 
795 GW (Eurelectric, 2009), while the 2010 capacity is projected to be 813.8 GW (Eurelectric, 2010). 
The increased amount of installed capacity in the 60% RES and 80% RES scenarios of the ECF are 
due to the increased required amount of solar, wind and back-up plants. This is illustrated by the 
values presented in Table 2. The first column again presents projected values for 2010 (Eurelectric, 
2010).  
Table 2. Installed capacity [GW] of PV and wind, in the envisaged scenarios of the considered 
studies. 
   2010           2050       
      Eurelectric        ECF        IEA-ETP 
          40%RES  60% RES  80% RES     
   [GW]      [GW]     [GW]  [GW]  [GW]     [GW] 
               
Solar PV  16    125    195  555  815    125 
Wind onshore  80    257    140  165  245    259 
Wind offshore  4     125     25  130  190     99 
Note the relatively low numbers for wind capacity in the ECF scenarios, possibly due to the relatively high load 
factors assumed, i.e., 35% and 45% for new build onshore and offshore, respectively, in 2050. 
 Erik Delarue, Leonardo Meeus, Ronnie Belmans, William D'haeseleer and Jean-Michel Glachant 
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2.3 Matching demand and supply 
A European zero carbon power system in 2050 will still need to match demand and supply with a 
combination of backup power, grid expansion, storage and demand response. This balancing will be a 
key issue. In what follows we introduce these options and then compare which are taken in the 
scenarios of the three studies. 
2.3.1 Introducing the options 
First option is back-up power. This is basically installing a certain amount of conventional 
(dispatchable) power for every MW of installed non-dispatchable capacity. This back-up power 
ensures that electricity can be generated when it is needed and when the non-dispatchable sources are 
generating insufficiently. Second option is expanding the grid. Assuming that the wind will always 
blow somewhere, and that the sun will always shine someplace, expanded interconnections can 
transport the power to where it is needed. Third option is storage, which allows capturing the power 
when generated, storing it (energy) and releasing it back when necessary (when there is demand). 
Fourth option is demand response, which shifts demand to match supply (e.g., consume when power 
from non-dispatchable renewables is available). Note that for the integration of all these options 
combined with the massive amount of variable sources, smart grids will play a crucial role. 
2.3.2 Scenario comparison 
Of the four considered options regarding flexibility and supply/demand matching, all studies put 
emphasis on the electric network. The Eurelectric study uses a DC load flow approximation to model 
transmission. The model covers 241 existing and new lines (exogenously imposed). The cross-border 
transmission capacities amount to an aggregated value of 179 GW in 2005. This is expected to 
increase to 245 GW in 2020, to 253 GW in 2030, and to remain stable thereafter. Expressed in relative 
terms, the increase in cross-border capacity amounts to about 40% (2005-2050). 
The ECF puts great emphasis on the future development of the grid. A major expansion of 
interconnection capacity between national transmission networks is required, to integrate the proposed 
amounts of RES, to allow sharing reserves and to reduce curtailment. The model employed covers 15 
major interconnections between so-called ‘centers of gravity’, spread over Europe. The aggregated 
capacity on these interconnections is currently 34 GW and increases (by 2050) with following 
amounts in the different scenarios: 
•  40% RES: 56 GW 
•  60% RES: 103 GW 
•  80% RES: 166 GW 
In relative terms, this represents additional capacity of about 65%, 200% and 390%, for the three 
scenarios respectively.  
Demand response can be introduced by the deployment of smart grids. Examples include efficient 
charging of electric vehicles (no vehicle-to-grid storage has been assumed) and use of heat pumps. 
This demand response can reduce the need for transmission and backup services. The ECF study 
features a ‘20% demand response’ option for the three different scenarios (i.e., 20% of daily electricity 
demand can be shifted within a 24-hour period), which lowers the needs for transmission investment 
and back-up generation to some extent, especially in the scenarios with more RES.  Decarbonizing the European Electric Power Sector by 2050: A tale of three studies 
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2.4 Costs 
In all projections, a zero carbon electricity system by 2050 will require much higher capital costs and 
hence upfront investments. This is due to the important role of RES, CCS and nuclear, all 
characterized by high capital costs (compared to more fossil fuels – without CCS – in the baseline) 
and to the fact that the overall installed capacity will be higher, because of the limited load factors of 
RES (e.g., wind, PV), as demonstrated earlier. In the Eurelectric scenario, investment in power 
generation amounts to 1.75 T€ (12% higher than the baseline scenario)
5. The investment in the power 
grid is also substantial, resulting in 1.5 T€ (which is reported to be 35% or some 400 G€ higher than 
baseline). Hence, the total additional investment cost in the power sector (i.e., generation and 
transmission) is about 25% or 600 G€ higher than the baseline. In the ECF report, the investment in 
power generation in the baseline ranges from about 27 (2010) to 35 (2050) G€/year. In the zero carbon 
pathways, these investments significantly increase to about 55-70 G€/year in the period 2025-2035, 
after which they slightly decrease. The investment in transmission (aggregated 2010-2050) lies at 
levels of about 53 G€ up to 182 G€, which is significantly higher than the reference case (10 G€). 
Investment in back-up generation is reported to be about 93 G€ to 131 G€, again well above the 
baseline (32 G€). In the IEA-ETP scenario, additional investment in the power sector is 780 G$ over 
the period 2010-2050.  
The additional investments are reported to be offset by lower fuel cost (RES and nuclear). The 
average price of electricity in the Eurelectric scenario is practically the same as in the baseline 
(significant increase during 2010-2025); from 95 €/MWh (2005) up to 145 €/MWh in 2050 (in 2005 
€). The ECF presents an integrated cost of electricity, which is about 10% higher than base case (77 
€/MWh) in 2050, and practically equal in all three zero carbon scenarios: 85 €/MWh (40% RES 
pathway), 85 €/MWh (60% RES pathway) and 83 €/MWh (80% RES pathway)
6. This integrated cost 
includes generation (investment + operation) and grid costs (HV transmission investment, back-up 
capacity, balancing). 
However, projected costs strongly depend on the assumptions made related to the grid, back-up, 
storage and demand response. The most optimistic cost estimate is obtained when assuming a well 
integrated EU electricity system, allowing for the option of cheap and unrestrained network expansion. 
Grid reinforcements and expansion indeed lower the need for back-up capacity (the wind will always 
blow somewhere, goes the argument, as discussed above). However, such an approach lacks possible 
practical difficulties with this network expansion and does not account for the costs associated with 
these difficulties (feasibility, licensing, conflicting incentives of member state versus EU wide 
approach). The other extreme, i.e., the most pessimistic estimate, considers local regions and attributes 
high back-up capacity and corresponding costs to the deployment of RES. Note also that the 
investment cost for the massive grid expansion as proposed by the ECF (53 – 182 G€, for an 
expansion of 65% - 390%) is lower than the number proposed by Eurelectric (1.5 T€, for an expansion 
of 40%). Given these differences, it is clear that the overall cost of electricity in these scenarios 
deserves more detailed scrutiny and study. 
                                                      
5  T€ stands for Tera or 10
12 €, while G€ indicates Giga or 10
9 €. 
6  It is remarkable that the reported integrated costs are practically the same for the three considered ECF pathways, given 
the different assumptions of these pathways. This aspect might require further study. Erik Delarue, Leonardo Meeus, Ronnie Belmans, William D'haeseleer and Jean-Michel Glachant 
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3. Policy recommendations  
In what follows, we first discuss what the policy recommendations of the three studies have in 
common, to then highlight their differences.  
3.1 Similarities in the three studies 
The main similarities in the three studies are first the importance of grid reinforcement, expansion and 
planning they demonstrate and second the central role of the EU ETS they express. 
3.1.1 Importance of grid reinforcement, expansion and planning 
The importance of grid reinforcement, expansion, and planning is emphasized in all three studies. RES 
are typically characterized by a variable and to some extent unpredictable profile, and are only limited 
dispatchable. The existing European grid and balancing mechanisms have been able to absorb the 
current amount of RES. However, given the expected levels of RES deployment towards 2050, the 
electricity grid will play a crucial role. The network will have to be fundamentally expanded, both on 
the transmission (high voltage) side (increase cross border interconnections towards an integrated 
European system) and on the distribution level (enable increasing amount of distributed generation 
and demand side management). Evolving towards a so-called ‘smart-grid’ is a further important step. 
The increasing amount of variable sources will call for more balancing requirements and an 
increasingly important role for storage, so as to keep the system reliability at the proper levels. Rules 
for grid access together with a clear regulation framework for renewables integration must be set up. A 
‘smart’ connection between supply and demand will be necessary. The enrollment of smart grids will 
be crucial in this regard, calling for coordination and standardization. Significant R&D investment 
efforts in these areas are required. The need for additional balancing requirements and regulation 
needs to be identified and addressed. A European strategy for network reinforcements and 
development will have to be developed. Rather than aggregating national action plans, a plan with EU-
vision has to be set up. Appropriate licensing and permitting procedures will prove crucial for timely 
investments. 
All three surveyed studies mention the importance of ensuring enough grid investment. The ECF 
recommends expanding ACER/ENTSO-E to develop a strategic interconnection plan. The IEA-ETP 
similarly calls for a roadmap for improving electricity and gas interconnections. 
3.1.2 Central role of the EU-ETS 
The EU has set up the European Union Emission Trading Scheme (EU ETS), initially as an instrument 
to meet its obligation under the Kyoto protocol. As from 2005, this cap and trade system entered into 
force.  
The EU ETS is currently Europe’s main instrument in the fight against climate change. According 
to economic theory, a cap-and-trade system with a cap progressively decreasing and effectively going 
to zero in 2050 would set an appropriate price on CO2 and thereby would trigger the optimal amount 
of investment in and deployment of low-carbon technologies. This would yield the optimal (lowest 
cost) carbon free generation mix. A consistent price for CO2 is an important and crucial requirement in 
the path of decarbonization.  
When considering the three studies discussed throughout the paper, all recognize EU ETS as 
central key instrument, to be set in line with the 2050 target. The Eurelectric study calls for well 
functioning carbon and electricity markets so as to deliver carbon reductions at least cost. On a 
broader scale, all sectors should internalize the cost of greenhouse gas emissions. The report supports Decarbonizing the European Electric Power Sector by 2050: A tale of three studies 
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a carbon price as sole driver (over time) for low carbon investments. A carbon price of 103.2 €/ton (€ 
2008) is projected in 2050. The ECF recommends to “set EU ETS in line with 2050”, while the IEA-
ETP calls for “a strengthening of the EU ETS”. 
3.2 Main difference in the three studies 
In the Eurelectric scenario, “no binding RES-targets are set after 2020”, while “RES support 
mechanisms remain fully in place until 2020 and are then gradually phased out during 2020-2030”. 
This means there is a sole reliance on the EU ETS CO2 price (as from 2030) for the deployment of 
low-carbon technologies. The ECF and the IEA-ETP on the other hand do consider continuing with 
targets for RES in combination with a more harmonized EU RES trading scheme. In what follows we 
introduce the main risks of relying solely on the EU-ETS, and the arguments for taking additional 
measures. 
3.2.1 Introducing the main risks of relying solely on the EU-ETS 
The main risks include windfall profits, over-allocation, the allocation process in itself, price volatility 
and lock-in. Some of these risks are often expressed as critiques on the EU ETS (for an overview, see 
Ellerman and Joskow (2008)). The introduction of a price for carbon may yield so-called windfall 
profits. Three different kinds of windfall profits are identified by Lévêque et al. (2009). The first type 
relates to the impact on short and long-run equilibria of electricity market. In the short-run (with 
current technologies in place), profits of different types of power plants can change due to a change in 
merit order and a different market clearing price (accounting for the price of carbon). In the long-run 
however, the price for carbon will affect the optimal generation mix, where in the optimal solution 
revenues will equal costs (zero windfall profit). The latter effect is the desired effect of a carbon price. 
The second type of windfall profit relates to imperfect market conditions. If certain technologies are 
constrained in deployment, the optimal generation mix can not be reached. Hence, these constrained 
technologies will enjoy a scarcity rent (this will be explained below). The third type of windfall profit 
concerns the allocation mechanism. A constraint on CO2 emissions creates a scarcity rent. If 
allowances are initially allocated for free, this rent is captured by the generators and hence represents a 
windfall profit. 
Windfall profits (of the first and third type) have been reported (Sijm et al., 2006). The first type is 
inherent to the introduction of a carbon price, and windfall profits in this case are limited in time. They 
might be taxed so as to recover them. Concerning the third type (related to initial allocation), 
allowances will be auctioned in the power sector as from 2013 (main rule with some exceptions), 
instead of allocating them for free to the generators. Especially the second type of windfall profit is 
relevant in the 2050 context. After all, the electricity market faces several constraints and has several 
market imperfections: difficulties arise related to planning and licensing. Especially some types of 
RES and nuclear (public acceptance) face severe permitting and licensing restrictions, preventing them 
from free deployment. If the carbon price is the sole driver towards low carbon, the marginal 
abatement cost might become very high if expensive technologies are needed to respect the cap
7. With 
the CO2 price being set by the marginal technology, significant windfall profits will be made by, e.g., 
operators of constrained technologies like nuclear or wind turbines. Taxation of these profits might be 
an option but could become practically difficult.  
Avoiding this high equilibrium CO2 price by, e.g., imposing RES targets might be a possibility 
(note that if certain types of RES become competitive, some of such targets might even be exceeded). 
                                                      
7  A well interconnected European system reduces possible impediments of deployment of certain technologies, as it covers 
a larger geographic area and combines various MS policies. Hence, this also reduces the risk of facing the second type of 
windfall profits. Erik Delarue, Leonardo Meeus, Ronnie Belmans, William D'haeseleer and Jean-Michel Glachant 
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In the 2050 framework, it has been demonstrated that RES will play a crucial role. The low or zero 
carbon technologies are characterized by high investment costs compared to relatively low variable 
costs. Carbon prices in the current range (10-20 €/ton) seem not sufficient to trigger such investments
8. 
Furthermore, the increase in electricity demand due to the shift from the other sectors will only occur 
on the longer term, thereby not providing the current incentives needed.  
The EU ETS further does not prevent investments in CO2 intensive technologies “locking in” 
carbon emissions for a long time span. Especially in the 2050 framework, investing now in carbon 
intensive technologies imposes a significant lock-in and stranded costs in the future. This inherently 
poses difficulties with future claims from the industry (indicating so-called “negative windfall 
profits”). A typical example is building a new coal plant (without CCS) with a lifetime of typically 40-
60 years
9. Several Member States, however, already announced or implemented restrictions on the use 
of carbon intensive technologies (like coal) or on the building of new capacity, for example obliging 
new coal plants to be equipped with CCS on part of their output, and with the option to employ CCS 
on the full capacity. 
3.2.2 Additional policy recommendations in the studies 
In the Eurelectric scenario, no binding RES targets are set after 2020, and RES support is gradually 
phased out in the period 2020-2030. After 2030, the carbon price becomes the sole driver for the 
deployment of low carbon technologies. The ECF on the other hand does consider implementing 
complementary measures to invest in low carbon. The EU should “request MS to come forward with 
long term targets for deployment of key renewable generation technologies and adopt parallel 
measures for CCS”. The IEA-ETP calls for a harmonized trading system for RES. 
Concerning lock-in, substantial early retirement of capital stock might already even be required 
(IEA, 2008). Therefore, strong signals on a long term climate policy should be provided. Restrictions 
on new carbon intensive capacity might be a necessity. The ECF explicitly mentions the option of 
ruling out investment in carbon-rich generation. They furthermore call for a review of the wholesale 
market arrangements, to ensure proper incentives for demand side resources and system balancing.  
4. Summary and conclusions 
The challenge faced to limit climatic change to acceptable levels is huge. The EU will have to move to 
a practically zero carbon energy system by 2050. This paper has focused on the impact of such a 
transition on the demand for electricity, the composition of the generation mix, on the corresponding 
balancing of this demand and supply, and on the cost, together with policy implications. Three main 
reference studies have been used throughout the paper: The Power Choices study by Eurelectric, The 
Roadmap 2050 by the European Climate Foundation and the Energy Technology Perspectives by the 
IEA, all released in 2010. 
Due to electrification of both transport and heating/cooling, the electricity demand is projected to 
increase substantially towards 2050 despite a higher overall efficiency both at the demand and 
generation side, with up to 50% compared to current levels. Basically three technology options are 
available in a zero carbon system: RES, nuclear and fossil fuels with CCS. The amount of RES faces a 
lower limit of 40% over the different studies, ranging up to as high as 80% in one of the scenarios of 
the ECF. Assuming 40% of the electricity generation in 2050 by RES, this means a multiplication of 
                                                      
8  Towards 2050, carbon prices will increase. However, at this moment, sufficient investment is already required, to benefit 
from learning and to stay in line with the 2050 target.  
9  One should, however, account for the option of a coal plant being ‘CCS-ready’, or for the option of fuel switching, to 
transform the plant to run on biomass. Decarbonizing the European Electric Power Sector by 2050: A tale of three studies 
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the current RES generation by a factor of 4. Especially wind energy is projected to increase and 
contribute significantly to this number. Given the limited load factors of RES, the installed capacity in 
the European power system is almost double of the current level, already in the 40% RES case. The 
role of the electric network will be crucial, although numbers tend to differ significantly among the 
studies. Especially the grid extension and balancing requirement deserve further investigation. The 
low or zero carbon technologies (RES, nuclear, CCS) are characterized by high investment costs. All 
studies report a significantly higher investment burden compared to the baseline cases. This additional 
upfront cost is, however, offset by savings in fuel cost, resulting in a levelized cost of electricity 
comparable to the baseline. The fact that the cost of electricity generation in the three ECF scenarios is 
about the same might require further study.  
In this transition, EU ETS will play an important role. Relying solely on a carbon price, however, 
might not be sufficient. Although comparable in outcome, the Eurelectric study does advocate this sole 
reliance on carbon pricing, while the ECF and the IEA-ETP call for RES targets and a harmonized 
RES trading scheme. Lock-in of carbon intensive technologies might be another aspect deserving 
attention. Finally, significant investment in the grid will be required, to move towards a well 
interconnected European power system. This is emphasized by all three studies. Erik Delarue, Leonardo Meeus, Ronnie Belmans, William D'haeseleer and Jean-Michel Glachant 
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